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OFF-LABEL DRUG PROMOTION  
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Off-label promotion—pharmaceutical manufacturers’ marketing of FDA-
approved drugs for unapproved uses—is considered a First Amendment right by 
some, a threat to the safety and effectiveness of pharmaceutical drugs by others. 
Although off-label prescription is legal and often beneficial, the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and corresponding FDA regulations effectively 
prohibit off-label promotion. The FDA can look to statements by pharmaceutical 
representatives as evidence of a drug’s intended use, thereby placing manufacturers 
that promote off-label in a Catch-22: the drug will be subject to the FDCA’s 
misbranding provisions if manufacturers add labeling instructions for that intend-
ed use, but also if they fail to add those instructions. To legally promote a new 
intended use, pharmaceutical companies must satisfy the FDA’s rigorous approv-
al process. In United States v. Caronia, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that the FDCA could not be interpreted to prohibit truthful, off-label promotion.  
Professors Stephanie Greene and Lars Noah debate the constitutionality of 
the FDA’s prohibitions in light of Caronia and the Supreme Court’s increased 
deference to commercial speakers’ First Amendment rights. Professor Greene 
argues that Caronia was wrongly decided because the court failed to scrutinize 
the nature of off-label promotion. Greene contends that the truthfulness of off-
label information is “speculative, unknown, or inaccessible,” and that the FDA’s 
restrictions on off-label promotion serve two substantial interests: ensuring that 
both doctors and consumers receive accurate, scientifically based information, 
and assuring that drugs have been proven safe and effective. Professor Noah 
questions Greene’s assumption that promotion of off-label drug uses is pre-
sumptively untruthful or misleading. He argues that Supreme Court precedent 
cuts against Greene’s position, and that the FDA’s restrictions on off-label 
promotion are unconstitutionally broad because they prevent drug manufactur-
ers from disseminating even truthful and nonmisleading information, and because 
the FDA could accomplish its goals through less-speech-restrictive means. 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
FDA Prohibitions on Off-Label Marketing Do Not Violate  
Drug Manufacturers’ First Amendment Rights 
 
 
STEPHANIE M. GREENE† 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers maintain that truthful and nonmisleading 
promotion of drugs for off-label uses is protected by the First Amendment 
right to free speech and that regulations that restrict such speech are 
unconstitutional. This argument ignores the very purpose of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which seeks to protect the public 
by ensuring that pharmaceutical drugs are safe and effective for their 
intended uses. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2012). The truth about the risks and 
benefits of off-label uses is frequently known only by the manufacturer, 
whose motivation is to generate sales. In evaluating off-label promotion as 
commercial speech, courts must recognize that the current regulatory 
scheme is a response to the tragedies that occurred under prior regimes, 
when drugs could be freely promoted without proof of their safety or 
efficacy. Given the government’s strong interest in protecting the public 
health through the approval process for new drugs, restrictions on off-label 
promotion should withstand constitutional scrutiny, even in the current 
climate of expanded protection for commercial speech.  
 Under the FDCA, each new drug must undergo a rigorous approval 
process to show that it does what it purports to do and that, with respect to 
its intended uses, the benefits of the drug outweigh the risks. Id. § 355. The 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is charged with overseeing the 
approval process for new drugs. Part of that process includes reviewing all 
of the manufacturer’s clinical studies, both positive and negative, and 
approving a label that includes the indications, dosage, precautions, warn-
ings, and contraindications. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2013). The FDA ensures 
that the labeling is not “false or misleading in any particular.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(d). Introducing a drug into interstate commerce without proper 
labeling constitutes the crime of “misbranding.” Id. §§ 331(a), 352(a). 
Although FDA regulations do not directly prohibit off-label promotion, 
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such promotion is tantamount to misbranding. Oral statements by pharma-
ceutical representatives may be used as evidence of a manufacturer’s 
intended use for a drug, 21 C.F.R. § 201.128, thus rendering the drug’s 
labeling subject to scrutiny under the misbranding provisions if it does not 
contain “adequate directions for [that] use.” See 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) ; 21 
C.F.R. § 201.5. 
Although misbranding is a crime, off-label prescription is common, with 
perhaps more than twenty percent of prescriptions written for off-label 
uses. See David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based 
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006). It is not 
illegal for doctors to prescribe off-label and the FDCA clearly states that it 
should not be construed to interfere with the practice of medicine. 21 
U.S.C. § 396. Off-label prescriptions may have important benefits, especially 
in cases where there are no other treatment options available. The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that off-label prescribing “is an accept-
ed and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate.” Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001). But pharmaceutical compa-
nies take advantage of the doctor’s right to prescribe off-label, targeting 
doctors in order to reach new markets for unapproved uses, and thereby 
avoiding the time and expense required by the FDA approval process.  
Detailing, the practice of sales representatives visiting doctors in their 
offices to promote drugs, is especially effective for off-label promotion. Not 
only do companies spend substantially more money on marketing than on 
research, but a substantial proportion of the marketing budget is allocated to 
detailing. See Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of 
Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative 
Review, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 785, 785-86 (2005). 
Evidence shows that doctors are susceptible to these marketing techniques 
and that their prescribing habits are impacted. See Adriane Fugh-Berman & 
Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and 
Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. 621, 623-24 (2007). The practice of detailing 
raises ethical issues as it may persuade doctors to prescribe unnecessary or 
more expensive drugs; these concerns are compounded when sales representa-
tives promote off-label uses that have not been proven safe and effective. 
The government has had considerable success in prosecuting drug man-
ufacturers for off-label promotion. See, e.g., Erika Kelton, Off-Label Pharma 
Prosecutions Won’t Be Silenced by First Amendment Decision, FORBES (Jan. 4, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2013/01/04/off-label-pharma- 
prosecutions-wont-be-silenced-by-first-amendment-decision. Increasingly, 
however, pharmaceutical manufacturers have raised the First Amendment 
as a defense to (or even in anticipation of)  such charges. This defense, 
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however, rests on manufacturers’ unsubstantiated claims that the infor-
mation they provide is in fact truthful and not misleading. Furthermore, in 
promoting drugs for off-label use, manufacturers bypass the FDA’s approval 
process, upsetting a system that seeks to assess the risks and benefits of 
drugs for a particular, intended use. Seizing on language in recent Supreme 
Court cases that struck down restraints on commercial speech, the industry 
recently convinced the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that 
its First Amendment argument has merit. See United States v. Caronia, 703 
F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). The Caronia decision, however, is fraught with 
flaws. First, the decision fails to recognize that the defendant’s off-label 
promotion was evidence of his intent to misbrand the drug in question. 
Second, in applying commercial free speech principles, the court gave 
inadequate consideration to the importance of the FDA’s premarket 
approval process, which is designed to protect the public health. 
The pharmaceutical industry’s first successful First Amendment chal-
lenge involved provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Moderni-
zation Act (FDAMA) that restricted the dissemination of information 
about off-label uses in printed materials such as medical journals. See Wash. 
Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83, 87 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated 
in part, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). As a result of that challenge, the 
FDA altered its interpretation of FDAMA, characterizing it as providing a 
“safe harbor” for drug manufacturers rather than authorizing the FDA to 
prohibit or sanction speech. See Wash. Legal Found., 202 F.3d at 335. When 
the FDAMA “safe harbor” provisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000), 
expired, the FDA issued a new guidance document that loosened restrictions 
on drug manufacturers’ distribution of medical or scientific journal articles 
about off-label uses, but still required the information disseminated to be 
reliable and scientific. See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD 
REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL 
ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS 
ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED 
OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
oc/op/goodreprint.html.  
The early success of the Washington Legal Foundation litigation, as well as 
a series of Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of First Amend-
ment protection for commercial speech, further emboldened the industry to 
seek protection for off-label promotion in other arenas, such as the practice 
of detailing. Recent Supreme Court decisions expanding protection of 
commercial speech have demonstrated concern with promoting the free 
flow of factual, verifiable commercial information to help consumers make 
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informed decisions. In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court held that a 
Vermont statute that prohibited pharmaceutical companies from using 
prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes violated the First 
Amendment. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). And in Thompson v. Western States 
Medical Center, the Court held that a law that prohibited pharmacies from 
advertising specific compounded drugs also violated the First Amendment. 
��� U.S. ���, ��� (����). Unlike the factual, verifiable information involved 
in these cases, claims regarding off-label promotion through detailing are 
not verifiable because only the manufacturer has access to all of the positive 
and negative scientific evidence about the drug. Because meetings between 
doctors and sales representatives occur in the doctor’s office and are not 
open to public scrutiny, it is impossible to know whether the communicated 
content is truthful or misleading. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting 
Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ 
michelle-mello/files/����/��/Off-label_PDF.pdf. More importantly, by 
choosing to promote off-label, manufacturers succeed in evading the FDA 
approval process, which would require submission of all clinical trial evidence—
both positive and negative. This process is in place specifically to provide 
doctors and the public as much truthful and reliable information as possible.  
The Supreme Court’s concern that consumers have the information they 
need to make informed decisions also dictates against protecting off-label 
marketing. Courts have mistakenly assumed that doctors are able to discern 
misleading from nonmisleading information provided by drug manufacturers. 
In IMS Health, the Court referred to doctors as “sophisticated and experi-
enced” consumers. 131 S. Ct. at 2671 (citation omitted). The medical 
literature, however, demonstrates that doctors are not able to distinguish 
between valid and misleading information. Doctors learn about new prod-
ucts primarily from the pharmaceutical industry and it is rare for them to 
read in depth about new drugs. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS 
THINK 221 (2007).  
In United States v. Caronia, a panel of the Second Circuit held in a 2–1 
decision that provisions of the FDCA could not be interpreted to prohibit 
truthful, off-label promotion. 703 F.3d at 162. In so holding, the court 
improperly applied the Supreme Court’s analysis in Western States and IMS 
Health. Perhaps most importantly, the court did not have the opportunity to 
consider whether the defendant’s statements were truthful and not mislead-
ing. If it had, the First Amendment defense would not have succeeded. 
The government charged Alfred Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales repre-
sentative, with misbranding when he promoted the drug Xyrem® for off-label 
use. Id. at 152. Xyrem is a powerful depressant that the FDA approved for 
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two indications associated with narcolepsy, a serious sleep disorder. Id. at 
155. Xyrem contains a black box warning, the most serious warning the 
FDA issues, because its side effects include seizures, coma, and death. Id. 
According to the government, Caronia conspired to misbrand the drug 
because he promoted it for unapproved uses such as insomnia, fibromyalgia, 
muscle disorders, and chronic pain. Id. at 156-57. Caronia was under sub-
stantial pressure to sell the drug for off-label uses as representatives were 
required to meet an annual sales quota and Caronia was near the bottom of 
his company’s national sales force. Id. at 172 n.3 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
Caronia maintained that he was prosecuted for truthful, nonmisleading 
speech. See id. at 160 (majority opinion). The truthfulness of his speech, 
however, was never an issue at trial since the government believed it needed 
to show only that he promoted the drug for an off-label use. Id. Thus, the 
court never considered whether Xyrem was safe or effective for the uses 
that Caronia proposed. Had the truthfulness or misleading nature of 
Caronia’s claims been at the heart of the case, the court’s analysis would 
have been quite different. The Supreme Court has held that the govern-
ment is “free to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is 
false, deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction.” 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) 
(citations omitted). More recently, the Court identified the threshold 
inquiry in commercial speech cases as whether the speech is misleading: 
misleading speech, the Court stated, “is not protected by the First Amend-
ment.” Western States, 535 U.S. at 367.  
In prosecuting Caronia, the government could have emphasized the false 
and misleading nature of the off-label promotion, particularly because 
Caronia promoted the drug as “very safe.” Caronia, 703 F.3d at 157. Instead, 
the government emphasized only the off-label nature of the promotion and 
the defendant’s intent to misbrand the drug by introducing it into com-
merce. Id. at 158-59. A divided panel concluded that Caronia had been 
improperly convicted for his speech. Although the jury instructions included 
explanations about the elements of misbranding and conspiring to mis-
brand, the court found that the government’s summation, together with the 
jury instructions, gave the impression that the off-label promotion itself was 
prohibited. See id. To avoid conflict with the First Amendment, the court 
concluded that the FDCA should not be construed as criminalizing the 
simple promotion of a drug’s off-label use. Id. at 160.  
The court should have considered Caronia’s speech as evidence of his 
intent to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce. In Wisconsin 
v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment “does not 
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prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or 
to prove motive or intent.” 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993). Thus, the problem the 
government encountered in Caronia may be rectified by a change in empha-
sis from off-label speech to intent to misbrand.  
Because it considered Caronia’s statements truthful, nonmisleading 
speech, the Second Circuit used IMS Health as a template for its First 
Amendment analysis. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164. In IMS Health, the Court 
offered two different standards for assessing the constitutionality of com-
mercial speech. In addition to citing the traditional Central Hudson test for 
commercial speech restrictions, IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68, the Court 
found that “heightened judicial scrutiny” was required because the speech 
involved “viewpoint discrimination,” with both content- and speaker-based 
restrictions. Id. at 2663-64. The Court found that the law disfavored speech 
with a particular content (marketing), when expressed by certain disfavored 
speakers (pharmaceutical manufacturers). Id. at 2663. According to the 
Court, the Vermont legislature designed the law—which prohibited phar-
maceutical companies from using prescriber-identifying information to 
market their drugs—to prevent marketers from more effectively selling 
high-cost, brand-name drugs, rather than the lower priced, generic drugs 
favored by the state. Id. at 2661. Heightened scrutiny is required, the Court 
stated, “whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.’” Id. at 2664 (citing Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).  
The Caronia court determined that heightened scrutiny was required to 
assess the constitutionality of restrictions on off-label promotion because 
the restrictions are content-based in that they distinguish between favored 
speech (uses that are FDA-approved) and disfavored speech (uses that are 
not FDA-approved). 703 F.3d at 165. Further, prohibiting off-label promo-
tion is speaker-based, the court reasoned, because it targets one kind of 
speaker (pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives) while 
allowing others (such as doctors and academics) to speak freely about off-
label uses. Id.  
In applying heightened scrutiny, the Second Circuit suggested that an 
agency seeking to uphold its own regulatory system is viewpoint discrimina-
tory. This analysis simply makes no sense. The purpose of prohibiting off-
label promotion is to protect the public health by ensuring that both doctors 
and consumers receive accurate, scientifically based information—a mission 
accomplished through the FDA approval process. The court’s analysis leads 
to the conclusion that distinguishing between approved and unapproved 
drugs is viewpoint discriminatory, a conclusion that would make the entire 
FDA approval process unconstitutional. 
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The Second Circuit also made fatal errors in applying the Central Hudson 
test. To survive Central Hudson, the government must prove that its regula-
tion of nonmisleading speech regarding a lawful activity: (1) stems from a 
substantial government interest; (2) directly advances that interest; and (3) 
is not more extensive than necessary. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). The district court in 
Caronia found that each element was satisfied: (1) the government has a 
substantial interest in the health and safety of its citizens, as well as in 
subjecting drugs to the FDA premarket approval process; (2) prohibiting 
off-label promotion directly advances that interest; and (3) the misbranding 
provisions are no more extensive than necessary because restricting market-
ing behavior is one of the few methods by which the FDA can encourage 
manufacturers to seek FDA approval for news uses of a drug. See United States 
v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398-402 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, 703 F.3d 149. 
The Second Circuit’s focus on the lawfulness of prescribing off-label, 
and on the fact that the FDA anticipated some off-label use, Caronia, 703 
F.3d at 166, ignores the fundamental nature of the speech involved. The 
doctor’s decision to prescribe is not commercial speech; it is the off-label 
promotion that must be scrutinized. The Second Circuit also concluded that 
restrictions on off-label promotion interfere “paternalistically” with both 
doctors’ and patients’ access to information about off-label use. Id. Restrict-
ing off-label promotion, however, is not a paternalistic effort by the FDA to 
keep doctors and patients in the dark about new treatments. It is, on the 
contrary, a corollary of the very core of the FDA’s mission to assure doctors 
and the public that drugs have been proven safe and effective.  
In IMS Health and Western States, the Supreme Court expressed concern 
about paternalistic regulation, but its concern centered on ensuring that the 
public received truthful, nonmisleading information. How can the truthful-
ness of off-label information be assessed? Access to all of the manufacturer’s 
in-house clinical trial protocols and research reports—both positive and 
negative—as well as its marketing strategy, might be a starting point, 
although it is unlikely that manufacturers would be willing to disclose such 
information. The truthfulness of off-label information is speculative, 
unknown, or inaccessible. One author has wisely suggested that when 
manufacturers raise truthfulness as a defense, the manufacturer should bear 
the burden of proving the truthfulness of its off-label claims. See Christopher 
Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Promotion 
Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 127-31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=2318618. 
Because the truth of off-label promotion cannot be presumed or proven 
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without access to all of the manufacturer’s research, restricting its use is 
consistent with Supreme Court decisions that place a premium on ensuring 
that consumers receive truthful, nonmisleading information.  
FDA regulations reflect the policy—supported by extensive evidence—
that drugs should be promoted based on scientific proof that they are safe 
and effective, not on anecdotal information, conjecture, or profit motives. In 
Western States, the Supreme Court recognized that “[p]reserving the effec-
tiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly 
an important governmental interest, and the Government has every reason 
to want as many drugs as possible to be subject to that approval process.” 
535 U.S. at 369. To that end, the government should continue to prosecute 
drug manufacturers for off-label promotion. With a focus on the false and 
misleading nature of off-label claims, as well as the intent to misbrand, the 
problems the government encountered in Caronia are easily overcome. 
Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent, while expansive in its protection 
of commercial speech, does not support protecting speech that bypasses the 
truth-seeking mission of the FDA’s approval process. The First Amend-
ment should not be manipulated to protect information that has the poten-
tial to unleash unknown risks and dangers on an unsuspecting public. 
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REBUTTAL 




If the law is against you, argue the facts.  
If the law and the facts are against you, pound the table and yell like hell. 
 
Carl Sandburg (1936) 
 
Professor Greene essentially concedes that all of the recent decisional 
law cuts against her position, so instead she relies on generalizations about 
overeager sales representatives, gullible doctors, and untested off-label uses. 
Her focus on the admittedly garbled decision in United States v. Caronia, 703 
F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), fundamentally misconceives what’s at stake in this 
debate, and she fails to mention that the Department of Justice decided not 
to file a petition for certiorari in that case. See David Sell, U.S. Won’t Pursue 
Case of Pharma Salesman, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 25, 2013, at A23. Perhaps 
the government feared that the Supreme Court might take the occasion to 
put another nail in the coffin of FDA speech regulation. 
No one doubts that, several times in recent years, pharmaceutical com-
panies have promoted off-label uses in genuinely misleading ways. For 
instance, Warner-Lambert’s campaign for the anticonvulsant Neurontin® 
(gabapentin) attracted plenty of justified criticism. See Stephanie Greene, 
False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 
110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 59-60 (2005); Michael A. Steinman et al., 
Narrative Review, The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal 
Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 284, 290 (2006); see also 
In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 51 (1st Cir.) 
(affirming a ���� million judgment in favor of health insurers), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 786 (2013). Whether the controversy involved Neurontin or the 
narcolepsy drug Xyrem® (at issue in Caronia), the fact that the promoted 
uses happened not to appear in the approved labeling struck me as entirely 
beside the point—the companies would have found themselves in equally 
 
† Professor of Law, University of Florida. 
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hot water had they made the same unfounded claims of safety and effec-
tiveness about the on-label uses of their drugs, see 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) 
(2013), and the First Amendment does not stand in the way of sanctioning 
such advertising. 
Professor Greene criticizes the federal prosecutors in Caronia for failing 
to emphasize the misleading nature of the defendant’s statements (e.g., 
calling Xyrem “very safe,” 703 F.3d at 157, even for its approved uses seems 
entirely outrageous given the black box warning), but why would they go to 
that trouble when off-label promotion alone, which requires far less proof, 
runs afoul of federal law? If the FDA’s flat prohibition on any mention of 
such uses fails constitutional scrutiny, then the government would have to 
shoulder the greater burden of proving in what respect a drug advertise-
ment included a false or misleading claim. The First Amendment demands 
no less, and it represents sheer hyperbole to suggest that a contrary conclu-
sion would somehow imperil the FDA’s entire system of pharmaceutical 
regulation. Even without the current advertising prohibitions, drug manu-
facturers would have incentives to seek agency approval for new indications 
because, for instance, health insurers often restrict reimbursement for off-
label uses. See Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 391, 397-98 (2009). 
To put the constitutional issue in stark relief, assume that a seller can 
adequately substantiate an appropriately limited claim of safety and effec-
tiveness for an off-label use and also makes clear (by a prominent disclaimer 
or otherwise) that the use has not received the FDA’s blessing. Imagine that 
Pharmerica Inc. has developed a novel anticoagulant. As required by federal 
law, it cannot begin selling this new drug without first securing a license 
from the Agency based on substantial testing conducted first in preclinical 
(animal) studies and then in clinical (human) trials. See LARS NOAH, LAW, 
MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 260-64, 270-71 (3d ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter NOAH, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY]. By all accounts, the 
process of testing an investigational compound and then securing approval 
of a new drug application (NDA) requires a substantial investment of time 
and resources, averaging on the order of a dozen years and over $1 billion. 
See id. at 261. Assume that this investigational drug beats the odds, see id. at 
158, and receives FDA approval for use in guarding against blood clots in 
patients at a heightened risk of stroke. 
A few years after Pharmerica introduces its prescription drug under the 
fanciful brand name Ridaclot, independent researchers using an unimpeachable 
study design and applying conventions for statistical significance discover 
that the drug also slows cognitive decline in the earliest stages of Alz-
heimer’s disease. The results of their work appear in the Archives of Geriatric 
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Neurology, a respected but somewhat obscure peer-reviewed journal, and the 
popular press fails to report these findings to a much wider audience. 
Wholly apart from opening a potentially lucrative new market, Pharmerica 
believes that it has a public responsibility to ensure that these results get 
disseminated more broadly to physicians; after all, Alzheimer’s patients 
currently have few promising treatment options, and nothing would prevent 
physicians from prescribing Ridaclot for this purpose. 
Under FDA regulations that go back almost half a century, however, 
Pharmerica cannot share any information about such an off-label use with 
doctors. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (advertising may not “recommend 
or suggest any use that is not in the labeling accepted in such approved 
new-drug application or supplement”); id. § 202.1(e)(6)(i), (xi) (same); see 
also 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3) (2012) (providing that a prescription drug shall be 
deemed to be misbranded unless its seller includes in all advertisements a 
true statement of “such other information . . . as shall be required in 
regulations”). But see Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160 (concluding inaccurately that 
the “regulations do not expressly prohibit or criminalize off-label promo-
tion”). No matter how carefully it structures the communication to avoid 
overstating the results or implying that the Agency has approved the 
indication, the company could not mention use in treating Alzheimer’s 
disease anywhere in its labeling or advertising (in print or other medium) 
for the drug. Pharmerica first would have to file a supplemental new drug 
application (SNDA) and await the Agency’s imprimatur. See Lars Noah, 
Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & 
TOXICS LIAB. ���, ��� & n.�� (����). Although such “efficacy supple-
ments” require far less effort than the original NDA, they are neither cheap 
nor fast (nor invariably successful). See id. at 145 & n.26. Even in the 
unlikely event that the sponsor could submit the previously published 
research rather than undertake its own expensive trials to satisfy the FDA’s 
demanding standards, the application fee itself would cost over $1 million. 
See Notice, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2014, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 46,980, 46,984 tbl.7 (Aug. 2, 2013). 
If the Agency rejects the SNDA because it remains unpersuaded about 
the utility of the drug for Alzheimer’s patients, Pharmerica would have to 
remain silent about this use. If approved, the SNDA would authorize the 
company to add a line or two to the list of indications in the package insert, 
which in turn would allow the company to advertise this now on-label use, 
but in all other respects the product would remain identical to the one 
originally introduced. In short, Pharmerica needed the FDA’s permission to 
speak, in this hypothetical, by expending millions of extra dollars (and 
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waiting several more years) to secure a license that would authorize it to 
communicate truthful information about an entirely permissible use of an 
already lawfully marketed product. Indeed, the FDA regularly (if belatedly) 
approves off-label uses, see NOAH, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, supra, at 272-
73, which suggests that the earlier evidence favoring such uses had some 
justification after all, even before the Agency officially concurred. Perhaps I 
am just seeing the proverbial glass as (almost) half full, but the oft-cited 
survey that Professor Greene references concluded that more than a quarter 
of identified off-label uses “were supported by strong scientific evidence” 
(even Neurontin hit nearly ��%) and some unspecified additional fraction 
presumably had at least limited scientific support. See David C. Radley et 
al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006). 
Pharmerica might skip the SNDA step by finding indirect methods of 
getting the word out about the off-label use of Ridaclot. It could purchase 
thousands of reprints of the published article and mail these to physicians 
around the country, and it could sponsor continuing medical education 
(CME) programs where the authors of the study could discuss their results. 
Although at present no regulations specifically address such quasi-
promotional campaigns, the FDA has issued nonbinding guidance docu-
ments that indicate it would permit these sorts of efforts only under the 
narrowest of circumstances. The FDA recently revoked the 2009 guidance 
cited by Professor Greene that had addressed the mailing of reprints, 
replacing it with a draft guidance document that specifies when manufac-
turer involvement in the dissemination of such materials would not draw 
the Agency’s ire. See Notice of Availability, Revised Draft Guidance for 
Industry on Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on Unap-
proved New Uses—Recommended Practices, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,793 (Mar. 3, 
2014); see also Notice, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and 
Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997) (focusing on 
CME events). 
Unlike other FDA advertising regulations that aim to guard against par-
ticular types of potentially false or misleading claims, the blanket prohibi-
tion on any statements concerning off-label uses sweeps broadly to prevent the 
dissemination of information even if it is presented in an entirely truthful and 
nonmisleading way. Surely this arrangement would strike First Amendment 
scholars as at least mildly perplexing, if not blatantly unconstitutional. Many 
academics think that the Supreme Court’s increasing solicitude for “com-
mercial speech” is profoundly misguided, but that represents another debate 
altogether. For purposes of resolving the question at hand, we need to take 
as given the commercial speech doctrine as presently configured, particularly 
Debate - Off-Label Promotion - Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2014 5:57 PM 
252  University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 162: 239 
 
as set forth in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 
(2002), which invalidated a federal prohibition on advertising by pharma-
cists about compounded drugs. In contrast, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 2653 (2011), which invalidated a state prohibition on prescription data 
mining used by drug companies to facilitate more targeted pitches to 
individual physicians, strikes me as an outlier. The court in Caronia may 
very well have given that peculiar decision undue emphasis, as Professor 
Greene suggests, but prohibitions on off-label advertising fail heightened 
scrutiny even without IMS Health. 
In previous work, I have recounted the skirmishing in the lower courts 
over the FDA’s limited allowance for indirect advertising of off-label drug 
uses to physicians. See Lars Noah, What’s Wrong with “Constitutionalizing 
Food and Drug Law”?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 137 (2000); see also Wash. Legal 
Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting my 
earlier work for the proposition that “the FDA is not a peer review mecha-
nism for the scientific community”). More recently, I have explained that, 
when one fully appreciates the potentially radical aspects of Western States, 
even the Agency’s prohibitions on direct advertising may fail a constitu-
tional challenge. See Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free 
Speech vs. Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 72-
75 (2011); see also id. at 76-84 (questioning the constitutionality of restrictions 
on indirect promotion); id. at 85-�� (same, for efforts directed at patients). 
Western States has gotten remarkably little attention from commentators. See 
id. at 64 & n.147. Indeed, Professor Greene’s ���� article on off-label 
promotion included a First Amendment analysis that never once cited this 
decision, and her selective references to it here entirely fail to do this 
important decision justice. 
To my mind, the Supreme Court’s evident deployment of the “uncon-
stitutional conditions” doctrine in the context of commercial speech repre-
sents the most striking aspect of Western States. For purposes of this debate, 
it means that the FDA cannot pursue its ends through the back door either. 
Let us say that the Agency had not directly prohibited the advertising of 
off-label uses; under the statute, the FDA still could prosecute a company 
for selling an approved drug, if it lacked approval for some of its “intended 
uses,” by pointing to the company’s advertising of those off-label uses (or, 
as the government had charged in Caronia, for “misbranding” the drug in 
failing to provide “adequate directions” for these additional intended uses). 
Western States apparently prevents even that maneuver, however, because 
the threat of sanctioning conduct in this manner unduly burdens commer-
cial speech. See id. at 54-57 & nn.110-12. 
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More generally, the Supreme Court seems to have effectively barred 
advertising restrictions that serve any purpose other than guarding against 
potentially false or misleading claims. See id. at 67-68. Whenever govern-
ment seeks to pursue collateral purposes such as dampening consumer 
demand, non-speech-restrictive alternatives (e.g., barring the underlying 
conduct) invariably exist for accomplishing such goals. Or, if the govern-
ment wants to encourage drug companies to seek FDA approval of off-label 
uses, then it can offer incentives such as extended market exclusivity 
periods. See id. at 74-75 & n.186. Furthermore, in guarding against poten-
tially false or misleading claims, the Court routinely suggests disclaimer 
requirements as less-speech-restrictive alternatives, even if audiences 
routinely fail to read the small print. In the context of prescription drug 
advertising, health care professionals remain the primary audience, which 
makes a preference for disclaimers over flat prohibitions easier to swallow. 
Surely physicians comprehend what it means to say that a particular use 
qualifies as off-label, even if in other respects their information-processing skills 
are not nearly as good as people assume. See id. at 65-66, 72-73 & nn.178-79. 
Indeed, making prophylactic rules seems inevitably less carefully tai-
lored for this purpose than case-by-case enforcement to squelch particular 
instances of false or misleading advertising. The FDA’s preference to 
control drug advertising by issuing broad regulations dates back to an era 
before commercial speech enjoyed any constitutional protection. Once that 
changed in the mid-1970s, the Federal Trade Commission’s adjudicatory 
approach—and demand that sellers be able to substantiate whatever claims 
they wish to make—represents the more acceptable procedural choice. 
Professor Greene explains that the FDA cannot easily discover what 
transpires in doctors’ offices during visits from sales reps, and she also 
suspects that the purported evidentiary support for off-label uses will 
remain hidden at company headquarters. Successful recent prosecutions 
seemingly belie such practical concerns, but, even if they have some force, 
ease of enforcement alone would never justify an overbroad restriction on 
commercial speech. See id. at 60 n.132. Is Professor Greene suggesting that 
the First Amendment would allow the Agency to go still further than it has 
already and forbid detailing altogether in order to guard against the possibility 
that drug reps might pitch unfounded off-label claims to unsuspecting doctors? 
Lastly, the FDA’s increasingly popular practice of issuing technically 
nonbinding guidance documents while counting on its power to cajole—a 
cagey if not always successful effort to shield its dubious policies from 
judicial scrutiny and avoid other forms of accountability—seems to repre-
sent the least defensible method of all when First Amendment rights hang in 
the balance. See Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference 
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to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 905-06 
(2008); id. at ��� (“The FDA formulated its [indirect] off-label promotion 
policies in a manner designed to evade normal administrative law con-
straints.”). See generally Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administra-
tive Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2014). 
The Agency’s unambiguous regulations, noncommittal guidance documents, 
and threats of prosecution (or adverse action on pending license applica-
tions) make companies understandably hesitant to engage in constitutional-
ly protected communications about off-label uses of their products (or even 
dare mount judicial challenges to the FDA’s policies). In contrast, a regime 
of case-by-case scrutiny to screen out false or misleading claims would pose a 
far reduced risk of chilling legitimate communications about off-label drug uses. 
Let me close by quoting what struck me as Professor Greene’s most 
cringeworthy statement: “by choosing to promote off-label, manufacturers 
succeed in evading the FDA approval process, which . . . . is in place 
specifically to provide doctors and the public as much truthful and reliable 
information as possible.” As the judge in the previously cited Washington 
Legal Foundation litigation put it: “In asserting that any and all scientific 
claims about . . . prescription drugs are presumptively untruthful or mis-
leading until the FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA 
exaggerates its overall place in the universe.” 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67. The 
Agency’s rules barring any and all direct claims about off-label uses of 
pharmaceutical products unmistakably operate to keep truthful information 
from doctors in ways that the Supreme Court no longer allows. Then again, 
insofar as Professor Greene urges prosecutors to target false or misleading 
aspects of particular off-label promotional efforts (and favors academic 
proposals to demand that companies substantiate claims), our positions on 
the constitutional question may not be so far apart after all. 
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The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth 
 
 
STEPHANIE M. GREENE 
The history of pharmaceutical marketing practices and concern for the 
public health support restrictions on off-label promotion of drugs. Although 
the pharmaceutical industry has had some success with First Amendment 
challenges to restrictions on off-label promotion, the case law is hardly 
decisive. The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 
149 (2d Cir. 2012), is but one decision, and not a unanimous or well-
reasoned one at that. In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, the court 
limited its holding to “a very narrow form of manufacturer communication.” 
13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasis in original), vacated in part, 
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Although the court found that FDA Guid-
ance on dissemination of certain promotional materials was more restrictive 
than necessary, it did not dispute that many restrictions on off-label promo-
tion are necessary to incentivize manufacturers to seek FDA approval. The 
court recognized that there are “enormous differences between the permit-
ted marketing of on-label as opposed to off-label uses” and that many other 
types of communication regarding off-label uses, including “person-to-
person contact with a physician,” were still prohibited. Id. Its decision to 
allow dissemination of some materials about off-label uses was premised on 
the fact that the remaining restrictions were adequate to safeguard the FDA 
approval process and the public health. The court noted that “[w]ere manufactur-
ers permitted to engage in all [other] forms of marketing of off-label treatments, a 
different result might be compelled.” Id. Furthermore, although the Supreme 
Court has clearly broadened protection for commercial speech, I believe that the 
Court would find restrictions on off-label promotion constitutional.  
Referring to the Court’s decision in Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), Professor Noah maintains that “the Supreme 
Court seems to have effectively barred advertising restrictions that serve 
any purpose other than guarding against potentially false or misleading 
claims.” Even if the Court insists on expanding protection of commercial 
speech to that limit, the case can be made that promotion of unapproved 
uses is “potentially false or misleading.” Further, restrictions on off-label 
promotion survive constitutional scrutiny because they are no more restrictive 
of speech than necessary to maintain the integrity of the FDA premarket 
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approval process and to protect the public health. Cf. id. at 371-73 (striking 
down restrictions on advertising specific compounding practices because 
less-speech-restrictive alternatives could have protected the government’s 
substantial interest in preserving the integrity of the FDA’s new drug 
approval process while ensuring the availability of certain unapproved 
compounded drugs).  
As the Court specifically recognized in Western States, preserving the 
FDA’s new drug approval process is an important government interest and 
“the Government has every reason to want as many drugs as possible to be 
subject to that approval process.” Id. at 369. Professor Noah does not 
dispute the importance of this interest, but suggests that disclaimers and 
postmarket enforcement of false and misleading claims are preferable to 
“prophylactic rules.” Prophylactic rules, however, are at the very core of the 
FDCA. Decades of congressional hearings (in the 1950s and 1960s) that 
considered pharmaceutical marketing practices “showed that the pharma-
ceutical marketplace was filled with misleading promotional material on 
which physicians relied.” Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug 
Experiences: Congress Had Ample Evidence to Support Restrictions on the 
Promotion of Prescription Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 299, 301-02 (2003). 
The hearings also amassed “abundant evidence to support the conclusion 
that alternatives, such as disclaimers disclosing the state of the evidence 
supporting a claim, and postmarket enforcement actions, were inadequate to 
stop deceptive and dangerous products.” Id. at 300. Postmarket enforcement 
takes months or even years, during which time a drug remains on the 
market, exposing patients to dangerous or ineffective treatment. Disclaim-
ers are a poor method of controlling off-label promotion because evidence 
shows that they have a limited impact on physicians and that consumers 
frequently misinterpret or ignore them. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label 
Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 250-51 (2011) [hereinafter Kesselheim, Off-Label 
Drug Use and Promotion]. 
While pharmaceutical companies assert that doctors are the target audi-
ence of off-label promotion, the risks and consequences associated with 
unapproved drugs are passed on to patients who are frequently unaware of a 
drug’s unapproved status and receive no information with which to assess 
the risks and benefits of a disclaimer. Recognizing the influence that 
marketing has on physicians’ prescribing habits and the risks inherent in 
off-label promotion, Dr. Kesselheim and others have stated that physicians 
themselves will need to be the “bulwark against off-label promotion.” See 
Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing of 
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Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, PLOS 
MED., Apr. 2011, at 7 [hereinafter Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices]. 
While physicians play a critical role in assessing the merits of off-label 
promotion, the legal system must also fulfill its role in appropriately 
balancing First Amendment concerns with the risks of such promotion.  
In addition to disclaimers and postmarket enforcement, other less-
speech-restrictive policies have been proposed as alternatives to prohibiting 
off-label promotion, including taxing off-label use, requiring FDA review of 
off-label use that reaches a certain threshold, and extending market exclusiv-
ity for manufacturers who seek approval for off-label use. These alternatives 
place inadequate emphasis on patient safety and assume the ability to 
monitor expanding off-label use. See Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and 
Promotion, supra, at 251-52. Reducing the financial incentive to introduce 
unapproved uses to the market may be a more direct way to control off-label 
promotion. See Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage 
Inappropriate Off-Label Drug Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 659-60 (2013).  
In considering whether less-speech-restrictive alternatives are sufficient 
to maintain the integrity of the FDA premarket approval process and to 
protect the public health, courts should be mindful that Congress consid-
ered and rejected alternatives such as disclaimers and postmarket enforce-
ment as insufficient safeguards. After extensive examination of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the battle for a drug preapproval process based on 
safety and efficacy was won in ���� with the passage of the Kefauver–Harris 
Amendments. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 
780. The industry will undoubtedly continue to push for changes that 
provide new opportunities to promote off-label. Legislators and regulators 
must recognize that powerful industries have the ability to shape legislative 
and administrative rules to protect their interests. See Malcolm S. Salter, 
Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the 
Private Sector (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-060, 2010) (manu-
script at 14-25), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20 
Files/11-060.pdf. 
In addition to withstanding First Amendment scrutiny under Central 
Hudson analysis, there are strong arguments that off-label promotion is 
“inherently misleading” and therefore not deserving of First Amendment 
protection at all. See Waxman, supra, at 306-10. Because manufacturers are 
adept at disguising promotional speech as truthful, nonmisleading, and 
unbiased discourse, it is difficult to distinguish between “off-label promotion” 
and “non-promotional speech.” See Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and 
Promotion, supra, at 251. Professor Noah’s hypothetical about “truthful and 
nonmisleading” off-label promotion demonstrates the many conditions that 
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must be satisfied to ensure that off-label promotion is not misleading. The 
Pharmerica hypothetical assumes that a drug study yielding positive results 
for the treatment of Alzheimer’s is conducted by “independent researchers 
using an unimpeachable study design.” Given these qualifications, the 
information from the study might well be “truthful” but still we must ask: 
does it represent the whole truth? Doctors and patients should be informed 
whether the study can be replicated and whether any other studies yielded 
negative results. Research indicates that pharmaceutical companies are less 
likely to publish unfavorable results and even threaten researchers who 
intend to expose negative studies. See Donald W. Light et al., Institutional 
Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe and Effective Drugs, 41 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 590, 595 (2013).  
Professor Noah’s hypothetical poses the rare case in which off-label 
marketing is purportedly needed to address a heartbreaking disease that has 
few, if any, effective approved treatments. It posits that the manufacturer 
believes it has a “public responsibility” to broadly disseminate information 
about this study to physicians. Research indicates, however, that the goal of 
off-label marketing schemes is to generate more revenue than FDA-
approved indications could. See Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices, 
supra, at 3. Many real-world examples illustrate this point. Pfizer’s drug 
Bextra®, approved to treat arthritis and menstrual cramps, was widely 
promoted for off-label use in treating acute and surgical pain, in dosages 
well above those approved by the FDA. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays ��.� 
Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html. Risks to the kidney, heart, 
and skin were associated with increased dosages of the drug and it was 
eventually withdrawn because of these risks. Id. Although Pfizer paid ��.� 
billion to settle claims associated with the off-label promotion of Bextra and 
three other drugs, the $16.8 billion in revenues that it earned from those drugs 
demonstrates not only how effective off-label marketing can be, but also how 
dearly patients and the healthcare system pay. See Rodwin, supra, at 658.  
When projected sales are high enough, the risk of paying fines for off-
label promotion is apparently worth taking. For example, profits from the 
sale of Neurontin® for its FDA-approved use (treating epilepsy) were 
projected at approximately $500 million. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales 
Practices Litig., No. 04-10739, 2011 WL 3852254, at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 
2011), aff  ’d, 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013). An off-label marketing strategy, 
commenced in 1995, catapulted sales from $97.5 million to $2.7 billion by 
2003, with nearly 90% of Neurontin prescriptions written for off-label uses. 
See id. at *8; P.A. Francis, Pfizer Inc. Guilty, PHARMABIZ (May 19, 2004), 
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http://saffron.pharmabiz.com/article/detnews.asp?articleid=21919&sectionid=
47&z=y. Neurontin’s manufacturer ultimately paid $430 million to settle 
civil and criminal charges associated with off-label promotion—a fraction of 
its increased profits from the drug’s off-label sales. Press Release, Dep’t of 
Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil 
Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm. 
The oft-cited study concluding that “[a]mong off-label mentions, most 
(��%) lacked evidence of clinical efficacy, and less than one third (��%) were 
supported by strong scientific evidence,” David C. Radley et al., Off-label 
Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
����, ���� (����), underscores this problem. The fact that some off-label 
uses are ultimately proven safe and effective is little comfort to the patients 
and payers who have been subjected to the risks and costs of unsafe and 
ineffective uses.  
Assuming the facts that Professor Noah proposes, however, we would 
surely want the medical community to receive information about a promis-
ing treatment for Alzheimer’s. The most recent FDA guidelines indicate 
that the FDA would not view dissemination of a scientific or medical 
journal article about such a study as evidence of intent that the product be 
put to an unapproved use. See Notice of Availability, Revised Draft Guid-
ance for Industry on Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on 
Unapproved New Uses—Recommended Practices, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,793, 
11,794-95 (Mar. 3, 2014). In fact, the hypothetical assumes several of the 
safeguards that the FDA recommends: the study is conducted by independ-
ent researchers; there is adequate substantiation for claims of safety and 
efficacy; and the study appears in a peer-reviewed journal. See id. The 
FDA’s guidelines further suggest that the article be disseminated with the 
approved labeling; a comprehensive bibliography; publications that reach 
contrary results; and prominent disclosures of the drug’s unapproved status, 
as well as potential conflicts of interest (including financial interests) of the 
study’s authors. Id. These requirements are surely essential in assessing the 
reliability of the study. The FDA’s thinking on dissemination of peer-
reviewed journal articles is based on evidence that disseminated material 
does not always accurately or fairly reflect the current state of knowledge 
about the use in question and that manufacturers have little incentive to 
publish information that discredits the use of their drug. Thus the guide-
lines that the FDA provides support the dissemination of information in a 
manner that should inform recipients of its reliability, a goal that is con-
sistent with First Amendment jurisprudence. 
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It should also be noted that the FDA specifically recognizes the im-
portance of making new treatments available to patients, especially when 
there are few, if any, existing treatments. The FDA has created several 
processes to help accelerate availability of new treatments: Fast Track, 
Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, and Priority Review. See For 
Consumers: Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval and Priority 
Review: Expediting Availability of New Drugs for Patients with Serious Condi-
tions, FDA (June 26, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumersByAudience/ 
ForPatientAdvocates/SpeedingAccesstoImportantNewTherapies/ucm128291.htm. 
The Fast Track process recognizes Alzheimer’s as a “serious condition[]” 
that merits expedited review. Id.  
Professor Noah and I seem to disagree most fundamentally on the 
trustworthiness of the industry’s marketing practices. Professor Noah points 
out that the FDA’s regulations controlling drug advertisements date back to 
an era before commercial speech enjoyed any constitutional protection. The 
current expansive protection for commercial speech, however, is not 
without limits. Erosion of restrictions turns the clock back to the days when 
manufacturers could sell their products with no proof of safety and efficacy. 
In 1999, in the midst of its campaign to promote gabapentin (Neurontin) 
for off-label uses, a Pfizer executive proclaimed the drug to be “the ‘snake 
oil’ of the twentieth century.” See Jim Edwards, Lesson From Pfizer: Don’t 
Describe Your Product as “Snake Oil” in Internal Email, CBS MONEYWATCH 
(Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lesson-from-pfizer-dont-
describe-your-product-as-snake-oil-in-internal-email. In today’s climate of 
sophisticated marketing strategies, prophylactic rules restricting off-label promo-
tion in order to protect the public health may be more justifiable than ever.  
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No government agency has jurisdiction over the truth. 
 
The X-Files (1993) 
 
Professor Greene makes a powerful argument in favor of strong federal 
regulation over off-label drug claims, but her constitutional defense remains 
terribly flimsy. Notwithstanding Professor Greene’s suggestion to the 
contrary, I harbor no illusions about the capacity of physicians or the ethics 
of the pharmaceutical industry when it comes to marketing. See Lars Noah, 
Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the 
Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 391-95, 402-06, 430-49 
(2002). Unlike her, however, I do not regard the First Amendment as 
merely an afterthought or a bothersome obstacle to skirt. Again Professor 
Greene expresses concerns about making government enforcement more 
difficult, but isn’t that precisely the point of the Constitution? After 
studying this Agency for the last quarter century, I do not share her evident 
faith in the good sense of the FDA. 
More remarkably, Professor Greene now suggests that off-label promo-
tion may fail Central Hudson’s first prong as “inherently misleading.” The 
sole support offered for this astonishing proposition: an article by a distin-
guished member of the House of Representatives. Promotional claims about 
off-label (as well as on-label) uses of pharmaceutical products certainly have 
the potential to mislead, and the government may impose restrictions to 
guard against this possibility so long as it can satisfy the Court’s demanding 
form of heightened scrutiny, but to call such claims inherently misleading—
and therefore completely unprotected by the First Amendment—boggles 
the mind. See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(calling “almost frivolous” the FDA’s suggestion that health claims for 
dietary supplements were inherently misleading); see also United States v. 
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165 n.10 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The government does not 
contend that off-label promotion is in and of itself false or misleading.”). 
Professor Greene notes that, during the 1960s, Congress rejected the 
option of disclaimers. Interestingly, in spite of legislative findings of 
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promotional abuses in the field, it also failed to give the FDA full authority 
to regulate detailing. See Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent 
Can the FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 312-15, 323-26 (1992). Twenty 
years ago, by contrast, Congress endorsed the use of disclaimers (directed to 
laypersons no less) in tandem with typically unfounded promotional claims 
that otherwise would convert dietary supplements into unapproved new 
drugs. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-417, § �, ��� Stat. ����, ���� (codified at �� U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C) 
(2012)). From a public policy standpoint, that struck me as insane (talk 
about “snake oil”!); from a constitutional perspective, however, it better 
comports with the Supreme Court’s increasingly unforgiving application of 
the Central Hudson test. 
Finally, let us not forget that the Court in Western States showed remarka-
ble indifference to the considered choices that Congress had made about 
pharmacy compounding of genuinely unapproved drugs just five years 
earlier. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360-65 (2002) 
(describing the practice of preparing customized drugs for patients with 
special needs and the problem of pharmacists manufacturing drugs under 
the guise of compounding, and explaining that, in ����, Congress codified 
certain portions of an FDA policy granting a limited exception to new drug 
approval requirements for pharmacists who provide such compounding 
services); id. at 371-73 (holding that the prohibition on advertising the 
availability of particular compounded drugs failed the final prong of the 
Central Hudson test because, for instance, several other conditions included 
by Congress in the new provision might have sufficed to protect the 
government’s interests). Why on earth would the Court care about legisla-
tive judgments dating back more than half a century, especially insofar as 
Congress did not want physicians to hear certain things about drugs that 
had already undergone FDA approval (and why does she keep harping on 
the hazards of unapproved drugs when the issue before us concerns unap-
proved new uses for approved drugs)? 
Professor Greene dismisses my hypothetical as atypical, but I never sug-
gested that this represents the only application of the FDA’s rules that 
would violate the First Amendment—instead, it clearly demonstrates the 
overbroad operation of the Agency’s policies. Meanwhile, her continued 
preoccupation with false and misleading instances of off-label promotion 
clouds the issue. If off-label uses have such little merit, then the govern-
ment should—as it has done in limited cases—just ban the practice alto-
gether (except perhaps for certain specialties such as oncology). See, e.g., 21 
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U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (2012) (prohibiting the distribution of human growth 
hormone for off-label use); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical 
Health Servs. v. Abbott, No. 13-51008, 2014 WL 1257965, at *14-17 (5th Cir. 
Mar. ��, ����) (rejecting different constitutional objections to a Texas 
prohibition on off-label prescribing of the FDA-approved abortifacient 
mifepristone); see also Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in 
Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 179, 188-93 
(����). Although it surely would offend the American Medical Association, 
which makes the idea politically unrealistic, such a conduct-focused solution 
to this supposedly intractable problem would not offend the Constitution, 
and then Central Hudson’s first prong plainly would allow a ban on any 
affiliated advertising. 
Another application of the FDA’s rule against promoting off-label drug 
uses makes its constitutional infirmity even clearer, and this one represents 
a twist that not a single court or commentator has ever confronted—no 
doubt because, in practice, the situation would rarely arise. To extend my 
previous hypothetical, let us assume that Pharmerica finally gets its SNDA 
for Ridaclot, which allows the company to add Alzheimer’s patients to the 
indications in the package insert and then relatively freely engage in 
advertising of this new use. At the same time, Prescott Pharmaceuticals 
(best known for sponsoring the recurring “Cheating Death” segment on The 
Colbert Report), secures an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), see 21 
U.S.C. § 355( j) (2012), for its generic version of Ridaclot. The labeling for 
the generic must mimic the brand-name in almost all respects. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2013); Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471, 
2476 (2013); see also Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Chang-
es for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 
67,988-89 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (proposing to loosen this requirement 
by allowing ANDA-holders to strengthen risk information unilaterally). 
When the brand-name manufacturer gets agency approval for a new use, 
it generally secures three additional years of market exclusivity on just that 
use, which means that the FDA cannot approve an ANDA for that use until 
this period expires. Generic versions of the drug initially can only list the 
uses appearing in the originally approved labeling. See Lars Noah, This Is 
Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 910 & 
n.310 (2009). As a result, Prescott’s generic drug only indicates use as an 
anticoagulant, which means that the company also cannot advertise it as a 
safe and effective treatment for Alzheimer’s disease even though the FDA 
has approved precisely such a statement for Ridaclot. After waiting for the 
three-year exclusivity period (and any method-of-use patents, in case they 
run longer) to expire, and without having to submit any further evidence to 
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the Agency, Prescott will get permission to add this indication to the 
labeling for its generic drug and then relatively freely engage in advertising 
for this not-so-new use. 
What accounts for initially granting the brand-name company a monop-
oly over this new information that the FDA has anointed as truthful and 
nonmisleading? Whatever the explanation, does that justify making it a 
federal offense for a competitor to disseminate this very same information? 
In no sense does this prohibition help to guard against the making of false 
or misleading claims. If agency approval of an SNDA allowed a previously 
approved generic competitor to revise the labeling for its drug immediately, 
then brand-name manufacturers would, of course, have even less of an 
already weak incentive to seek FDA approval of new uses. The pursuit of 
such collateral purposes would not, however, stand much of a chance under 
the heightened scrutiny of Western States. 
Instead of granting three years of partial exclusivity, Congress could 
amend the FDCA to grant the NDA-holder two more years of full exclusiv-
ity with the first added use (and perhaps another year with a second added 
use). This would have the dual benefit of improving the incentive for filing 
SNDAs—without having to bar off-label promotion—and ensuring that 
generic drug manufacturers do not encounter the prohibition on making off-
label claims once the FDA approves their ANDAs. Congress crafted the 
six-month added exclusivity incentive for testing off-label uses in pediatric 
patients in roughly this manner. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)–(c) (2012); see also 
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Jennifer S. 
Li et al., Economic Return of Clinical Trials Performed Under the Pediatric 
Exclusivity Program, 297 JAMA 480 (2007). Delaying generic entry might 
seem like a steep price for patients and their insurers to pay, but the First 
Amendment casts serious doubt on the preferred current approach of 
casually trading away the speech rights of regulated entities and saving 
prosecutors the hassle of trying to separate the wheat from the chaff. 
Why has this aspect of the problem gone entirely unnoticed? At present, 
generic drug manufacturers have little reason to advertise. As with expendi-
tures for research and development, they free-ride on the marketing efforts 
of brand-name manufacturers, counting on dramatically lower prices 
coupled with generic substitution policies to gain market share. See Lars 
Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor’s 
Copycat Product, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 673, 678-79, 684 & 
n.53 (2010); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (barring a 
state effort to hamstring brand-name drug manufacturers in order to favor 
its message of encouraging the use of cheaper generic drugs). Nonetheless, 
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if that business model changed for some reason, then generic sellers would 
confront an absolute barrier to communicating any information about new 
FDA-approved uses during the brand-name manufacturer’s period of market 
exclusivity. For present purposes, this scenario has powerful explanatory value 
in highlighting the constitutional flaws of the Agency’s policies, and it suffers 
from none of Professor Greene’s concerns about ease of verification. 
In a related vein, the FDA’s flat prohibition on off-label promotion ena-
bles still other parties to interfere with the commercial speech rights of drug 
manufacturers. Although courts have declined to recognize any private right 
of action for violations of the FDCA, infractions may provide the basis for 
seeking penalties under collateral statutes or common law. This means that, 
even if the Agency exercised its largely unreviewable enforcement discre-
tion to look the other way so long as companies made sure to avoid false or 
misleading claims about uses that it had not approved, the opportunity for 
other public and private actors to make use of this bright line rule gives it a 
zero-tolerance quality. (The nonfinal and nonbinding guidance documents 
allowing limited forms of indirect promotion represent an unreliable 
expression of the FDA’s enforcement policy and in no way amend the 
Agency’s sweeping regulations.) In contrast, if those plaintiffs had to 
demonstrate that a drug advertisement violated the far more ambiguous 
FDA rules against making false or misleading claims, then they would find 
it tougher sledding absent a prior finding by the Agency of such a violation. 
See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the 
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 954-56 & 
nn.212-13 (1996). 
For instance, under the False Claims Act, whistleblowers have repeatedly 
pointed to off-label promotion as a basis for triggering prosecution even 
where the FDA later approved some of these uses. See Sandra H. Johnson, 
Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims 
Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 104, 110 
(2008); Natasha Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry on Off-Label Use, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at A1 (reporting several recent settlements totaling 
almost $5 billion). Public and private parties also have pursued claims under 
state consumer protection statutes when pharmaceutical manufacturers cross 
the clear line created by the Agency’s rules. See, e.g., In re Epogen & 
Aranesp Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 
1289 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., ��� F. Supp. �d ��28, 
1234-35 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (declining to dismiss claims against the manufac-
turer of Lipitor® for advertisements that implied the cholesterol-lowering 
drug’s usefulness in reducing the risk of heart disease before the FDA had 
approved such additional indications). Plaintiffs in these consumer fraud 
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cases sometimes also include (though generally without success so far) 
claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) Act. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., 
LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1356 & n.5, 1366-�� (��th Cir. ����) (off-label marketing 
of antipsychotic Seroquel®); see also J. Gordon Cooney, Jr. et al., Back to the 
Future: Civil RICO in Off-Label Promotion Litigation, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 168 
(2010). Finally, in tort litigation, plaintiffs have secured sizeable recoveries, 
including multi-million dollar punitive damages awards, by pointing to 
violations of the Agency’s prohibition on off-label claims. See, e.g., Proctor 
v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1212-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Wyeth v. Rowatt, 
244 P.3d 765, 772, 783-86 (Nev. 2010); see also Andrew E. Costa, Negligence 
Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. 
REV. 51, 75-76 & n.186 (2005). 
Lastly, Professor Greene points out that the FDA’s revised draft guid-
ance document would have allowed Pharmerica to distribute reprints of the 
peer-reviewed article describing Ridaclot’s utility in Alzheimer’s patients. I 
had conceded as much previously, but in practice manufacturers have not 
trusted this purported “safe harbor,” both because of its many cumbersome 
conditions and because the Agency has disclaimed giving it binding effect. 
See Notice, Agency Information Collection Activities; Dissemination of 
Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and 
Devices, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,708, 56,709 (Sept. 28, 2005) (estimating that the 
Agency would receive fewer than a dozen filings a year under a previous 
version of this exception). Also, no matter the caliber of the published 
research or the care in not overstating the results, the company definitely 
could not arrange for printed advertisements in prominent medical journals 
to announce this study. 
Even if, after purchasing a pile of reprints, Pharmerica affixed the dis-
claimers and additional information demanded by the Guidance (satisfying 
Professor Greene’s understanding of the First Amendment as entitling the 
government to demand “the whole truth”), nothing would prevent the FDA 
from charging the company with a violation of its regulations banning off-
label promotion, and, of course, any deviation from the Guidance would 
invite such a reaction. Moreover, the Agency could invoke its broadly 
construed authority over “labeling,” and, in addition to pursuing sanctions 
against the manufacturer and its products, the FDA could initiate a “sei-
zure” action (a form of pretrial detention) against the reprints themselves. 
If the government prevailed on the misbranding charges at trial, then the 
federal court would issue a “condemnation” order entitling the government 
to destroy the reprints. See, e.g., United States v. Articles of Drug, 32 
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F.R.D. 32, 34-35 (S.D. Ill. 1963). All this for failing to pay the price—in 
time, effort, and money—needed to secure FDA permission to share 
potentially valuable new therapeutic information with physicians about a 
previously approved drug. 
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